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Trading companies have played significant and strategic roles in international trade. The 
transaction costs economics, indicated that the role of trading companies is to reduce the 
transaction costs during export. The local institutions, which are considered as main determinants 
on business models in transition economies, are most likely to affect the transaction costs during 
export, and trading companies’ characteristics and their methods of reducing transaction costs.  
With six Chinese ETCs and their export processes as qualitative cases, this study identified four 
institutional voids associated with transaction costs for Chinese exporters and examine how 
Chinese Exporting trading companies (ETCs) responded to those costs and facilitated export 
between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers.   
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1 Introduction 
Trading companies are the earliest and most efficient facilitators for supporting local 
export (Jones, 2002; Perry, 1992). Being the “merchant” between manufacturers and 
foreign buyers, they are essential in international trade (Jones, 1998), facilitating 
manufacturers’ exports (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998) and foreign companies’ imports 
(Quintens, Matthyssens, & Faes, 2005). They support domestic manufacturers to search 
for and negotiate with foreign buyers (Peng, 1998). They provide various services and 
supports for exporting (Balabanis, 2005).  
 
Transition economies are defined as some countries and regions where formal and 
informal institutions are comprehensively and fundamentally changing, particularly 
from central planning to market-based economic reforms (Peng, 2003, p275). These 
economies are increasingly important for international trade. Different from developed 
economies with stable and effective institutions, however, transition economies 
experience a special period of mixed institutions (Nee, 1992), and result in a series 
institution-related problems (Child & Tse, 2001; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Witt & Lewin, 
2007). Institutional void is one of the most important characteristics of such 
distinguishing institutional environment in transition economies. Institutional void 
means the absent of effective and efficient institutions, which support the normal 
market exchanges and functions (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Mair & Marti, 2009). 
They considerably affect the business activities in transition economies.    
 
Despite the increasing share of export from transition economies especially China, 
trading companies form these economies have been ignored by academics and 
practitioners for a long time. Their contributions to international trade are significant, 
yet little is known how they achieved these. Specifically, what are the particular 
institutional voids they face when they facilitate transactions between local 
manufactures and foreign buyers?  
 
This paper aims to explore this key question. We combine institution-based view with 
transaction cost theory and identify the institutional voids that entail transaction costs 
associated with inefficient institution. An integrative approach is developed to examine 
the export-related institutions which generate costs for f domestic manufacturers and 
foreign buyers in exporting activities. We use China as a case study. Despite the 
increasing role of foreign investors and local firms in contributing international trade, 
the trading companies still contributed to more than 30% of export in China  (Yao & 
Chen, 2001). There is a dearth of research of the characteristics, the business models 
and the institutional environments that Chinese trading companies face in the 
international trade. This paper aims to fill the gap.   
 
The paper is organised as follows. After the introduction, the section two will review 
the relevant literature and develop an integrative approach. Section three presents the 
methods and data collection. Section four and five present the findings and discussions. 
Section six concludes.  
2 Theoretical framework of trading companies and proposition 
Terminology  
Trading companies have received massive attention from academic, practical and 
political fields due to their significant role in international business. As the earliest 
economic organization involved in international trade (Perry, 1992a), they can be traced 
back to “colonial time” (Jones, 2002). They are defined in many ways. In this study, 
we use the broad definition as international trade facilitators and mediators through 
marketing, distributing and selling products overseas for manufacturers and through 
searching for and organizing suppliers for foreign buyers (Perry, 1992). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective of trading companies 
Transaction costs economics is the dominant theory in the studies of trading companies 
due to its powerful explanation of trading companies’ existence and business models 
(Casson, 1998). Coase (1937) originally points out the emergence of the firm arises 
from the costs of marketing transactions. Williamson (1979, 1985, 1988, 1996) further 
systematized TCE as a paradigm for analysing economic organizations. Bounded 
rationality and opportunism are two basic behavioural assumptions. The former 
indicates that individual behaviour is intensely but limitedly rational, while the later 
reflects the incomplete information and necessity of ex ante screening of agents and ex 
post governance. Then, the transaction becomes the basic unit of analysis. Frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity construct three dimensions (asset specificity is the 
most important) of the transaction or contracting, and jointly determine different 
contracts and correspondingly different governance structures. The last point is the 
comparative approach (economizing transaction costs) to different transactions and 
governance structures. Williamson (1979, 1985, 1988, 1996) indicated that markets, 
firms and hybrid modes, as different government structures for organizing transactions, 
incur different degrees of costs, and the most efficient one can form.  
 
International trade incurs numerous transactions and contracting issues among sellers, 
buyers and intermediaries, large risks and uncertainty, great information asymmetry 
due to different time zones, location and culture (Casson, 1998). Therefore, all these 
generate huge transaction costs for international trade. The trading companies, as the 
intermediaries for linking different players involved in international trade, effectively 
reduce these transaction costs and therefore facilitate international trade (Peng, 1998).   
Institutional perspective of trading companies 
Institutions, as the rules of the game, offer stable structure for human interaction. They 
contain formal rules, such as political, judicial and economic rules, and informal ones, 
like cultures, customs, traditions, and codes of conducts, which “come from socially 
transmitted information” (North, 1990, p37). The institutions influence transactions and 
the level of transaction costs. Most institutions researched are capable of reducing 
transaction costs, however, others, like “rules that restrict entry, require useless 
inspections, raise information costs, or make property rights less secure”, actually 
increase transaction costs (North, 1990, p61). Institutions become the combination of 
lowering costs and raising costs ones, due to imperfection of the market (North, 1990).  
 
Such influences on transaction costs are variable for different organizations in the same 
institutional environment. It is common to state that institutions constrain certain 
trading partners and transactions. At the same time, they facilitate others by enabling 
these social actors and actions and granting licenses and special powers (North, 1990; 
Scott, 2008). Therefore, we believe that the local institutions in transition economies 
will exert effects on export transactions among manufacturers and foreign buyers. Then, 
the trading companies can reduce the institution-related costs on China’s export markets, 
while domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers fail to do so.  
 
In addition, transition economies are the countries and regions where formal and 
informal institutions are comprehensively and fundamentally changing, particularly 
from central planning to market-based economic reforms (Peng, 2003, p275). The 
incremental institutional change gives rise to a special period mixing former and 
emerging institutions. Based on previous literature on transition economies (Peng & 
Heath, 1996), this study divides institutional voids into three main perspectives: former 
formal institutional voids, current formal institutional voids and informal institutional 
voids. In the end, the theoretical framework combining transaction costs analysis and 
institutional perspective is developed as below: three main groups of institutional voids 
create additional transaction costs, while ETCs are able to reduce them.     
 
Theoretical framework in this study 
Propositions 
Institutional voids related to bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals 
Bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, as formal institution, is often 
labelled as an important institutional barriers for exporters (Kahiya, 2013). It is 
extremely true for Chinese exporters. With continuous influence from former central-
planned economy, the government is still playing an important role in emerging market 
economy in China (Child. & Yuan, 1996). One serious problem is the superfluous 
business licenses and permits. Jia and Ling (2012) reported that Chinese exporters had 
to obtain many export-related approvals and permits from different government 
department for each export transaction. The application and process of such licenses 
and permits inevitably incur inefficient and less transparent beaucratic administrative 
procedures (Estrin, Meyer, & Bytchkova, 2008), which increase Chinese exporters’ 
costs on money and time and make them less competitive. Moreover, it results in 
uncertainty for Chinese exporters. Similar to other emerging markets, fundamentally 
and continuously institutional transition towards market economy is a major 
characteristic of business environment in China (Buck, Filatotchev, Nolan, & Wright, 
2001; Peng, 2003). It leads to unstable and changing government policy, therefore, to 
notable uncertainty. Massive researches have approved that unstable and changing 
government policies with institutional change largely raise uncertainty and problems 
for business in emerging markets (Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004; Estrin et al., 2008; 
Peng & Heath, 1996). In general, these government policies increase uncertainty and 
additional costs for Chinese exporters. Therefore:  
Proposition 1. Chinese ETCs are able to reduce the transaction costs related to 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals 
 
Institutional voids related to the inefficient legal system and informal contract 
obligation 
The inefficient legal system and contract obligations are another two institutional voids. 
Legal system is a major formal institution (North, 1990), and largely directly influence 
the transaction enforcement and related costs (Furubotn & Richter, 2005). China has 
the reputation of having a weak legal system (Child & Tse, 2001), which fails to 
efficiently protect property rights (Peng & Heath, 1996) and intellectual property (Beata, 
2004; Child & Tse, 2001), and enforce contract (Luo, 2002), as raise opportunistic 
behaviours (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 1999). Furthermore, the informal institutions in China 
also enhance this situation. The absence and inappropriateness of formal commercial 
law in the history of China fails to construct a strong contracting spirit and 
obligation(Luo, 2002).  
 
Exporting involved in many different organizations, including manufacturers, suppliers, 
middlemen, exporting intermediaries, shipment companies and forwarders, and 
therefore requires efficient cooperation among them. Inevitably such kinds of 
cooperation are based on variable contracts and formal and informal enforcement. A 
weak legal system with poor informal contract obligation incurs a number of problems 
on exporting, including products quality and timely delivery, most of which are 
reported as key barriers for foreign buyers’ purchasing from China (LFRC, 2010; 
Nassimbeni & Sartor, 2006). In other words, many of current problems with exporting 
from China are actually contributed to two main institutional voids, weak legal system 
and poor contract obligation. Therefore:   
Proposition 2. Chinese ETCs are able to reduce the transaction costs related to weak 
legal system 
Proposition 3. Chinese ETCs are able to reduce the transaction costs related to 
inefficient Informal contract obligation  
3 Research Methods 
This study uses qualitative multiple cases study. First, the aim of this research is to 
explore the unknown Chinese ETCs and institutional environment, which is one 
“empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon” (Yin, 2003). China has 
become the top largest exporter, thanks to 30-years’ economic reform and export-
oriented developmental pattern. In China’s Statistical Yearbook (SSB, 2014) of the 
same year, 43 % of this huge sum of exports comes from local manufacturers in China. 
However, many researchers argue that local manufacturers from these developing 
countries, like China, are suffering from many competitive disadvantages for their 
export strategy at the level of firms, industries and institutional infrastructure (Gao, 
Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2009). Meanwhile, the institutions, as a “real-life context” will 
be explored. These institutions and Chinese ETCs will be illustrated as a combination, 
which is in line with the statement that “boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident”. Therefore, this study believes that local institutions will 
influence the level of transaction costs in China’s export markets. More specifically, 
such influence will be shown as institutional effects on main characteristics of 
transaction costs in this study, say bounded rationality, opportunism, frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity. 
 
The unit of analysis in this study is the Chinese ETCs’ export transaction process. The 
export transaction process is the unit of analysis in previous literatures on trading 
companies (Casson, 1998; Peng, 1998; Roehl, 1983), and transaction costs economics 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). It also helps to focus on the institutions and costs on China’s 
export market during these export transactions process. 
 
The in-depth and semi-structured interviews are main data collection method. The 
interviews are guided by a series of question lists and brief structure guide, and open-
ended questions at the same time. These interview questions start with context-related 
questions, including historical and background information on the cases and 
interviewees, and are followed by the questions related to the theoretical concepts, such 
as questions on whole exporting transaction process, specific transactional procedure 
and especially those on institutional voids, and conclude with the open-end questions 
on the interviewees’ opinions on institutional voids in their exporting process.  
 
In the timeline, there are three stages: pilot study A, pilot case study B and major case 
studies. The pilot study A is based on the interviews of domestic manufacturers, foreign 
buyers and Chinese ETCs, while pilot case study B is through Jia’s two-month 
observation in a Chinese ETC (Case A). These two studies mainly offer the 
specification of institutional voids on China’s export market in the early stage of 
research.  
4 Findings 
4.1 ETCs’ response to costs related to the bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals 
It is found that the inefficient bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals as 
the first institutional voids appear in all cases. Chinese exporters have to obtain a series 
of export authorities, business licences, and registrations for the start-up of export 
businesses. They have also to submit and/or receive a series of related 
documents/receipts to/from these relative government departments for each export 
transaction. These processes are complex, time-consuming and constantly changing, 
therefore reduce transaction frequency and generate additional uncertainty.   
 
In turn, all case ETCs efficiently process bureaucratic procedures and administrative 
approvals. Their major method is to amass and master specific and updated knowledge 
(including information and experience) on these bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals, such as the knowledge on how and where to apply for and 
register these official approvals and licences; about how, when and where to prepare, 
submit and receive these necessary official documents to/from various government 
departments. This knowledge helps ETCs to increase transactional efficiency and 
frequency, and reduce uncertainty.  
 
More specifically, this knowledge includes those about how and where to apply for and 
register these official approvals and licences as well as about how, when and where to 
prepare, submit and receive these necessary official documents to/from many different 
government departments. This knowledge is based on the presence of well-trained and 
experienced staff, and relevant routines embedded within the daily work of the ETCs. 
By mastering such knowledge, these ETCs efficiently process these bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative approvals with less time, resource-commitment and error 
rate. Thereby the transactional efficiency and frequency is increased. In addition, these 
ETCs frequently deal with these processes during their massive export transactions. 
Therefore they can also easily update their knowledge of the changes and new additions 
of the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals that ultimately reduce 
relative uncertainty.  
 
 
4.2 ETCs’ responds to costs related to inefficient legal system and informal contract 
obligation 
The data from cases also shows that export transactions are extremely affected by 
China’s inefficient legal system and informal contract obligation. All cases show the 
huge difficulties of enforcing export transactions, which are generated by opportunistic 
behaviours of domestic manufacturers. More specifically, these opportunistic 
behaviours refer to product quality problems (in cases A-F), production and delivery 
delay (in cases A-F), and breach of contract (in case C), which become the most 
significant problems of purchase in China’s export market. But the local legal system 
fails to prevent it and turns out to be the most important cause of such situation, 
according to the interviews from the cases. Legal system neither protects other related 
items with product from opportunistic behaviours. For instance, manufacturers could 
freely increase material price and illegally sell ETC’s branded products to other buyers 
in Case B. Because of the worries about patent, ETC D establishes a self-owned 
manufacturer and only uses it to produce such related products.  
 
In addition, the informal contract obligations in China are also problematic, and lead to 
many opportunistic behaviours and additional uncertainty. In all cases, the domestic 
manufacturers fail to efficiently enforce the export transactions according to their 
promise in original export contracts. These domestic manufacturers often freely receive 
orders without considering their capabilities, ignore the quality control and production 
schedule, and even intentionally raise prices, resulting in a series of problems during 
the enforcement of transactions.  
 
In contrast, case ETCs in this study acquire massive amounts of information on 
production, which definitely reduces the information asymmetry between 
manufacturers and buyers, decreases opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty, and 
reduces enforcement costs. The information on production generally contains three 
aspects: current production conditions, production processes and products, and 
manufactures’ characteristics. The information on current production conditions, such 
as the progress of production, enables Chinese ETCs to better control the production, 
including product quality and production schedule, minimizing the problems, and 
reducing the manufactures’ opportunistic behaviours during the production process.   
 
Moreover, the information on the production process and products, such as the quality 
control points on products and during the production process, increases the ETCs’ 
capabilities for finding out and avoiding these opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty 
during whole production process. The information on products does not only refer to 
the quality, types and styles, but contains all characteristics of the product. For instance, 
in Case C, pricing becomes rather important information, which is systematically 
collected, updated and used by the ETC to ease the uncertainty and manufacturers’ 
opportunistic behaviours,  and for re-negotiation post transaction.  
 
Finally, the information on manufacturers’ characteristics, which refer to the 
manufacturers’ product quality, capacity, credibility etc, makes ETCs choose the most 
reliable and suitable manufactures according to their different foreign orders. In general, 
the information on production helps Chinese ETCs to reduce the information 
asymmetry, to reduce the possibilities of opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty 
during production, and finally to reduce the enforcement costs. 
Institutions  Former formal institutional voids Current formal institutional voids Informal institutional voids  
Institutional voids  Bureaucratic procedures and 
administrative approvals 




The pre-export and post-export 
procedures 
The procedure of enforcing manufacturers The procedures for enforcing manufacturers  
Specific examples  ⚫ Licences and registration from 
various government departments 
to start export businesses 
⚫ Registration and approvals from 
various government departments 
for each export transaction 
⚫ Changing administrative 
procedures and policy 
⚫ Slow tax rebating system 
⚫ Quality problems  
⚫ Delivery problems  
⚫ Changed price 
⚫ Quality problems  
⚫ Delivery problems  
 
 





Knowledge (information and 
experience) of these bureaucratic 
procedures and administrative 
approvals 
⚫ Information on production, including current production conditions, production processes, 
products, and manufacturers’ characteristics 
⚫ Information on updated prices of product 
⚫ Vertical integration 
Brand, special certificates 
 
How costs are 
decreased by 
ETCs? 
By increasing frequency (dealing with 
more transactions than 
manufacturers), and reducing 
uncertainty 
By mitigating opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty  
 
5 Discussion 
In the past century, almost all socialist economies demonstrate a great deal of problems 
and are difficult to maintain, while other capitalist countries show more productive 
economies (Ingram & Silverman, 2002). With the increasing seriousness of problems 
in these economies, the transition from the former to latter is inevitable. The transitional 
process includes the collapse of previous institutions under the central planning system 
and the emergence of new institutions corresponding to the marketing system (Meyer, 
2001b; Peng, 2003). But the process of replacement is incremental (North, 1990, p6; 
Peng, 2003), due to path dependency and bounded rationality. Therefore, a number of 
problems related to institutional transition take place in these countries. This section 
provides further analysis on findings with comparison of existing literatures on trading 
companies and transition economies.   
Institutional voids  
The bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, as additional processes, bear 
the typical characteristics of the central-planning system and become the formal 
institutional void. The transition of institutions related exporting in China, such as the 
export authority, has been underway since 1949 and up to the present day. During the 
transition, export-related institutions were changing from that of a wholly central 
monopoly, to one of relative decentralization among the state-owned economies, and 
then to recently relatively open and fair administrative procedures within private 
economies (Li & Liu, 2012). However, the transition and reform of these former formal 
institutional constraints is not completed, just relatively weakened, and has shifted from 
being obvious to invisible. Due to the nature of central-planning institutions, these 
bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals still reduce the transaction 
efficiency on the current export market and generate additional costs for domestic 
exporters, especially for the emerging private and small-medium-sized exporters.  
  
The potential explanation of domestic manufacturers’ inefficient contract obligations 
can be two fold. On one hand, the inefficient formal legal system actually magnifies the 
potential for opportunistic behaviours of trading partners. The manufacturers behave 
opportunistically, as they feel free from such an inefficient legal system in China. For 
example, the domestic manufacturers get used to changing the agreed price, and 
breaking the contract, as they seldom face punishment from the legal system, or as they 
often only need to make some compensation to the buyers when they break the contracts 
(Case C).  
 
On the other hand, affected by the tradition and culture, the contract obligation in China 
become distinct, and require trading partners to completely understand, and adapt to 
them, and therefore generate additional uncertainty for them. For instance, Wang (2005) 
indicates that Confucianism and communist ideology can cause citizens in China to 
ignore certain necessary institutions in marketing economies, such as private property 
rights. In addition, Luo (2002) argued that the commercial contracts, as part of the 
inefficient legal system in China, fail to efficiently enforce contracts in China. Instead, 
the contract obligations largely rely on other social norms, such as personal 
relationships. However, the tradition of relying on personal relationships will result in 
inadequate contract obligations in normal cases, and newcomers’ will poorly adapt to 
such unique enforcement methods. As a result, it increases uncertainty and foreign 
buyers’ enforcing costs. In short, the inefficient contract obligations also fail to 
efficiently enforce export transactions in China’s export market.  
 
The cost of enforcement contracts is one important sub-cost in transaction costs theory 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p25), and is closely related to international trade in practice 
(Peng, 1998). The extant literatures on international purchasing and importing indicate 
that the quality and timely delivery of products become the most concerning problems 
for purchaser’s decisions as to selection of suppliers (Kannan & Tan, 2002; Katsikeas 
& Dalgic, 1995; Leonidou, 1999). In China this condition, particularly the problems on 
unreliable supplier, on-time delivery and product quality, is even more significant 
(LFRC, 2010; Nassimbeni & Sartor, 2006). The findings in this study echo these 
existing literatures. The enforcement of the export contract is one of the main problems 
for foreign buyers and trading companies. The inefficient formal legal system and 
informal contract obligation are the source of such problems.  
Chinese ETCs’ advantages on economizing these institution-related transaction costs 
Knowledge, in term of information and experience, has always been the trading 
companies’ advantages on economizing trade-related transaction costs. Peng & York 
(2001) state American export intermediaries’ performance relay on their knowledge on 
foreign market and export process. Carlos and Nicholas’s researches also highlight the 
significance of knowledge, information and experience on foreign markets for chartered 
trading companies (Carlos, 1992; Carlos & Nicholas, 1988, 1996). For Japanese general 
trading companies, information turn out be the most important determinant for their 
diversified businesses (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984; Young, 1974) .  
 
For this study, knowledge is the significant determinant for Chinese ETCs’ advantages 
on economizing these institution-related transaction costs. First, for the first 
institutional void, the specific and updated knowledge on these bureaucratic procedures 
and administrative approvals play an important role. This sort of knowledge helps ETCs 
to increase transactional efficiency and frequency, and reduce uncertainty. 
 
In addition, Chinese ETCs solve the inefficient legal system and contract obligations, 
by mastering the information on products, production and manufacturers’ 
characteristics. One of their main methods is reducing information asymmetry. Studies 
from transaction costs economics have indicated that the uncertain and complex 
information, which generates bounded rationality, is the  major reason for transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Moreover, asymmetric information is the  major 
reason for difficulty in identifying product quality and other resulting problems that 
stop transactions, such as adverse selection and moral hazards (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz 
& Weiss, 1981).  
 
Many studies indicate that the acquisition of information become an effective method 
to counter opportunistic behaviours, uncertainty, and relative high monitoring costs 
generated by local deficient institutions, such as the inefficient legal system, in 
transitional economies. For instance, Hoskisson et al (2000) believe that the information 
is useful for reducing monitoring costs in transition economies, where inefficient 
institutions increase opportunistic behaviours. Ahlstrom & Bruton’s (2006) study also 
indicates that accurate information on firms, which is vital for venture capitalists to 
monitor funded firms’ performance, is valuable and hard to obtain in emerging markets, 
along with the difficulties presented by the inefficient legal system.   
 
6 Conclusion 
In this study, four main institutional voids in China’s export market were found, 
including, bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, the inefficient legal 
system, inefficient informal contract obligations, and long-term OEM trading methods.  
These four institutional voids bear the typical characteristics of transition economies, 
where formal and informal institutions are comprehensively and fundamentally 
changing, particularly from central planning to the market-based economic reform 
(Peng, 2003, p275). The bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals and 
OEM trading method represent the formal institutions, which were inherited from the 
previous planned economy system (Estrin et al., 2008), but still exist in many forms 
during the period of the collapse of previous institutions under the central planning 
system, and therefore belong to the former formal institutional voids in the previous 
analytical framework. The inefficient legal system and contract obligations represent 
the lack of market-supporting institutions, which are hard to establish quickly, during 
the stage of the emergence of new institutions corresponding to the marketing system 
in these countries.  
 
Faced with these institutional voids in China’s export market and related costs on export 
transactions, Chinese ETCs design efficient and effective methods to reduce these 
institution-related transaction costs. These methods highly reply on the acquisition of 
knowledge, in term of information and experience, on bureaucratic procedures, 
production, products and domestic manufacturers.  
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